124 Tomasz Omieciński
about their own work may be, the critic has a broader per-
spective and knowledge of parallel currents, and sees cor-
relations between art and other areas of human life. It is not
the artist who explains his work, but vice versa – we can
understand the artist through the work (Morawski 2007,
127). As Tatarkiewicz writes, for the artist, styles […] are
a necessity, because they correspond to the way of looking,
imagining, thinking of their time and environment. They
are mostly unaware of them; the critic, especially the histo-
rian, is more aware of them than the artist (1982, 204–206).
Hence, it is usually the critics who can more accurately de-
scribe the inuences and causes of a particular work.
An example from the world of architecture is the descrip-
tion of the deconstructivism trend created by Mark Wigley
and Philip Johnson. The Deconstructivist Architecture ex-
hibition at the Museum of Modern Art in 1988, which they
curated, featured the works of seven architecture studios or
architects. Similar in aesthetics, they were brought together
under one banner – deconstructivist architecture. The artists
themselves had operated without awareness of the existence
of such a community until then, and most of them, despite
following similar intellectual paths in places, rejected the
common designation of “deconstructivists” (McLeod 1989,
43, 44). To this day, Peter Eisenman maintains that decon-
structivism in architecture, as described on the occasion of
this exhibition, did not exist, and that some of the major
assumptions of Wigley’s reasoning are wrong (Eisenman
2022). After more than 30 years have passed, it must be
acknowledged that architectural criticism has adopted Wig-
ley’s outlook – the term “architectural deconstructivism”
and the selection of its representatives are widely recog-
nized and understood according to the 1988 exhibition cat-
alog. The division between “deconstructivism” and “decon-
structionism” emphasized by Eisenman, which stems from
philosophical assumptions, does not seem to be as strong
a demarcation as the aesthetics of buildings.
Not only are the sources of architecture’s aesthetics eval-
uated dierently by critics and architects, but also its social
eects. Norman Foster believed that an architect must be
an optimist. In a speech he gave after receiving the Pritzker
Prize, he said his oce had always tried to ask the right
questions with insatiable curiosity and believed in social
context – that buildings are created by people and their
needs (Foster 1999, 1, 2), both material and spiritual. He
devoted the last paragraph to the responsibilities and chal-
lenges faced by architects. Jencks, however, considers high-
tech architecture as performed by Foster, seen as an end
in itself, to be nihilistic, while stressing that the architect
himself do not recognize this (Jencks 1994, 261). The ar-
mation of technique for its own sake leads to emptiness and
meaninglessness. Jencks claims the architecture profession
as a whole seems to have missed this. Increasing warnings
about the dangers caused by the impact of technological de-
vices on society show that it was probably Jencks, a critic
with a broader view of civilization, who was able to make
a more accurate simulation of the future.
Correctly understanding one’s actions can also be disas-
trous for an artist. According to Gołaszewska, structuring
reality binds us: later, it is not we who use our thoughts,
but they subjugate our lives (1984, 23). The same may be
true of the analytical texts of authors who, from the mo-
ment they announce their credo, refuse to deny it. Francis
Edward Sparshott believes that if artists describe their own
mannerism, they themselves risk over-intellectualizing their
artistic activity (Morawski 1973, 18). In order not to betray
their own “manifesto”, the architect can adapt the solutions
they create intuitively under a previously written doctrine.
This situation can result from a new look at the work when
it is completed (Gołaszewska 1986, 181). When it does not
require work from the artist, it becomes a dierent object
than before – a work that is, as it were, alien, further from
personal involvement.
For the creator, becoming aware of the creative processes
can be downright harmful. It is mainly the work that ex-
presses the artist’s views, but, as Potocka vividly described
it, […] it is a witness […] most often outlandish and, in
addition, very imprecise in his testimony (2007, 157). What
problem for the researcher arises from this? Well, just as
an artist adapts a work to earlier guidelines, they can bend
later guidelines to them. Content written after one text gains
popularity can be rebuilt along its lines. However, such sit-
uations are very dicult to detect.
4. An architect can use argumentation in a dishonest way.
It is an exceptional situation when an architect does not
act decently. Their argument is deliberately disingenuous be-
cause it increases the chances of success. Such a description
is no longer a professional explanation and turns into persua-
sion using manipulation. In each of the examples cited be-
low, without being sure of the creator’s bad intentions, only
the creator’s opinion was confronted with that of the critic.
In the modern world, as market mechanisms take over
increasingly more areas of life, art has also become a large-
scale stock market. Like any commodity for sale, it has re-
ceived extremely eective advertising. Myths are growing
around works of art to change the perception of the object
– from mediocre to a masterpiece of genius. Michael Bald-
win even says that modern art is more a result of the dis-
course on it than the creation of its artists, whom he harshly
calls vulgar (Cottington 2017, 69). Therefore, it is natural
that artists try to raise the price of their works with their own
image and statements.
Such a phenomenon also occurs in the case of architec-
ture – an art that requires winning the favor of a wealthy
investor to get a project built. Many architects’ explanations
of their concepts are closer to persuasion than translation.
They are trying to convince an alleged thought process,
which is very questionable upon further reection. Tom
Dyck ho accuses Daniel Libeskind of making his state-
ments about architecture seem like random thoughts pasted
together post factum (Dyckho 2018, 324). The architect ex-
plained the Graduation School building in London (Fig. 5)
as inspired by the constellation Orion, which appeared to
him above the plot of land intended for the building, but he
also said bluntly that he did not want to make a big deal out
of it (Dyckho 2018, 324). Hearing about this correlation
prompts the thought of an absurd “logic” by which one tries
to put incompatible elements of reality together – instead of
intellectual satisfaction, a sense of interacting with some-
thing original, something that is obvious but required the
intervention of a genius to make it appear to us. It is worth
